Yearly Archives: 2014

Is the Riksbank right in that the now wealthier Swedish households would be more vulnerable?

New Ekonomistas post (in Swedish). Here is an English translation.

From 1995 to now, Swedish households’ debt relative to their disposable income has almost doubled, from about 90 percent of disposable income to about 170 percent. The Riksbank maintains that the higher debt relative to income has made the households more vulnerable. “[A]s household indebtedness is now very high the households are more vulnerable” is a typical statement. But during the same period, the households’ assets and net worth has approximately doubled relative to disposable income, and is now about 580 and 410 percent, respectively, of disposable income. Households have thus become twice as wealthy relative to disposable income. Have the Swedish households, with now twice as much wealth relative to income, really become more vulnerable, as the Riksbank seems to imply?  Continue reading

The Riksbank: The effect of the policy rate on the debt ratio is neither economically nor statistically significant

New Ekonomistas post (in Swedish). Here is an English translation.

The Riksbank tries, in a box in its latest Monetary Policy Report, to counter my research and my posts about the effect of monetary policy on household indebtedness. The Riksbank tries to show that the effect of a lower policy rate is to increase real debt and the debt ratio, not to decrease them, as I have maintained. It is of course positive that the Riksbank engages in a discussion of these matters and tries to justify its policy better. But the Riksbank’s estimated effect turns out to be very small and not economically significant. And with a considerable margin, it is not statistically significant. In addition, the econometric model used in the estimation is not correctly specified. The Riksbank’s box thus has little weight, and it provides no support for the Riksbank’s policy.  Continue reading

Is the Riksbank right about Swedish mortgages posing a threat to financial stability?

New Ekonomistas post (in Swedish). Here is an English translation:

The Riksbank is fighting an uphill battle to ex post justify the monetary policy that, with too high a policy rate, has led to an inflation far below the target and an unemployment far above a reasonable long-run sustainable rate. It is not going very well. The Riksbank has, for instance, stated that (1) households’ expectations about future mortgage rates are too low. It has also stated that (2) higher debt has led to a larger fall in consumption and rise in unemployment, in the countries that were hit by a fall in housing prices during the recent crisis. But it is difficult to find any foundation for these two statements, which can be seen in this and this post. Furthermore, even if the statements were true, it does not follow that tighter monetary policy is the best response or that it would even improve the situation. For instance, a lower inflation than expected has led till a higher debt burden (not lower). The Riksbank has also stated that (3) a fall in housing prices might make banks’ financing of the mortgages more difficult and this way threaten financial stability. Is there any foundation for this third statement?  Continue reading

Unemployment and monetary policy – update for the year 2013

New Ekonomistas post (in Swedish). Here is an English translation:

How much higher is the unemployment rate because of the Riksbank’s monetary policy the last few years? This is a controversial question that the Riksbank prefers to avoid. Previously I haved reported a calculation of how much higher the unemployment rate has become up to the beginning of 2013, compared with if the policy rate had been kept unchanged at 0.25 percent since June/July 2010. My calculation has been criticized with obscure arguments in a speech by Per Jansson (for instance, that a low policy rate would not have been “realistic”). I have responded to Jansson’s criticism in a previous post. Now I have updated the calculation to include the whole year of 2013. The annual average during 2013 of the unemployment rate has as far as can be judged become about 1.2 percentage points higher, corresponding to 60 000 more unemployed, compared with what it would have been with an unchanged policy rate of 0.25 percent since the summer of 2010. With such a low policy rate, the inflation rate would have been higher and very close to the inflation target, and, as far as can be judged, the household debt-to-income ratio would have been a few percentage points lower, not higher.  Continue reading

How is the Riksbank handling the facts?

New Ekonomistas post (in Swedish). Here is an English translation.

The Riksbank maintains that household debt in Sweden is associated with risks and that this justifies a tight monetary policy resulting in low inflation and high unemployment. A representative statement about why household debt implies risks is given in a recent speech by the Executive Board member Kerstin af Jochnick (page 2):

We saw in the most recent financial crisis that high indebtedness in the household sector can create problems, with some countries suffering a severe fall in house prices. When the value of houses declines, households begin to save more. When savings increase, consumption decreases and thus demand in the economy falls. Ultimately, this can lead to lower production and higher unemployment. We do not want to see this kind of development in Sweden.

But is it really true that higher debt led to a larger fall in consumption and a larger rise in unemployment in the countries where housing prices fell during the financial crisis? Does this agree with the facts?  Continue reading

Biased memo from the Riksbank?

New Ekonomistas post (in Swedish). Here is an English translation.

The Council for Cooperation on Macroprudential Policy set up a joint analysis group in February 2013 to examine a few issues concerning household debt. (The council’s tasks have now been taken over by the newly established Financial Stability Council.)

Finansinspektionen (the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority) published three memos of very good quality from the group in October, 2013 (unfortunately in Swedish only, although they deserve to be translated into English). They are referred to in this post (Swedish only). Now, somewhat belatedly, the Riksbank has published three more memos, of mixed quality, from the group. One of these, Memo 6 ”Risks to the macroeconomy and financial stability arising from the development in the household’s debt and housing prices,” is unfortunately somewhat biased and possibly even misleading.  Continue reading

New short paper: “Resilience, Debt, and Net Worth: Has Resilience Increased with Higher Debt-to-Income Ratios?”

New short paper, “Resilience, Debt, and Net Worth: Has Resilience Increased with Higher Debt-to-Income Ratios?,” January 2014, paper.

Abstract

Since 1995, Swedish households’ debt has risen from about 90 percent of disposable income to about 170 percent and hence almost doubled. Many, including the Riksbank, conclude that this has made the households more vulnerable to disturbances. But at the same time, real and financial assets and net worth have approximately doubled. Total assets and net worth are now about 580 percent and 410 percent of disposable income, respectively. This doubling of assets and net worth should contribute to households’ being more resilient to disturbances. This short paper argues that a doubling of the average Swedish household’s balance sheets actually increases resilience, rather than reduces it. Generally, a richer household is more resilient than a poorer one.

 

 

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What are the effects of a fall in housing prices?

New Ekonomistas post, “What are the effects of a fall in housing prices?” (in Swedish). Here is an English translation.

One of the Riksbank’s reasons for a higher policy rate is that this would reduce the risk of a future fall in housing prices. A future fall in housing prices might lead to lower inflation and higher unemployment. But how large would the effects on inflation and unemployment be of a fall in housing prices of, for instance, 20 percent? There is a fair amount of information about this, including the Riksbank’s own reports and calculations. Most information indicates that the effects of a fall in housing prices of 20 percent would be relatively limited. They are hardly larger than the higher unemployment and lower inflation caused by the current monetary policy.  Continue reading

Ekonomistas guest post by Harry Flam: Bubble in the housing market?

Ekonomistas guest post by Harry Flam (in Swedish). Here is an English translation.

This is a guest post by Harry Flam, professor of international economics at the Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University.

The U.S. and several European countries have experienced large falls in housing prices in the wake of the financial and euro crisis. Housing market indices fell 43 percent in the U.S., nearly 50 percent in Ireland, and – so far – 30 percent in Spain. This has contributed to very negative outcomes in these countries: banks have suffered enormous credit losses and have cut down their lending, tax payers were forced to rescue many of them, households became less wealthy, and households and firms decreased demand, resulting in high unemployment.

With hindsight, it has been argued that housing prices in these countries were driven by expectations of future capital gains. Considering the fact that real housing prices in Sweden have experienced a historically large increase since the mid-1990s – prices of single-family houses have increased by about 300 percent – after having increased at the rate of the consumer price index before that, one may ask if we have a pricing bubble waiting to burst, with serious consequences for households, banks and the economy?  Continue reading

Are households’ mortgage rate expectations too low?

New Ekonomistas post (in Swedish). Here is an English translation.

Since last summer, the Riksbank has put forward a new reason for a higher repo rate (the Riksbank’s policy rate). The Riksbank suggests that households would have too low mortgage-rate expectations. But closer scrutiny shows that there is hardly any basis for the Riksbank’s suggestion. (This aside from the fact that, if households’ mortgage-rate expectations would be a problem, a higher repo rate is hardly the solution.) Continue reading