“Evaluating Monetary Policy,” in Koenig, Evan F., Robert Leeson, and George A. Kahn, eds., The Taylor Rule and the Transformation of Monetary Policy, Hoover Institution Press, 2012, p. 245-274. PDF. Abstract.
The line: With a modified Taylor curve, the forecast Taylor curve, and plots of mean squared gaps showing the tradeoff between the variability of the inflation-gap and output-gap forecasts it is possible to evaluate policy ex ante, that is, taking into account the information available at the time of the policy decisions, and even evaluate policy in real time.
“Anticipated Alternative Instrument-Rate Paths in Policy Simulations” (with Stefan Laséen, Sveriges Riksbank), revised May 2011. Forthcoming in International Journal of Central Banking. PDF. Abstract.
The line: We show how to do policy simulations with alternative arbitrary instrument-rate paths that are anticipated rather than unanticipated as in the method of modest interventions of Leeper and Zha.
“Transparency under Flexible Inflation Targeting: Experiences and Challenges,” Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review 1/2009, 5-44. PDF. Abstract.
The line: Some personal views and reflections on transparency experiences and challenges following my first year as Deputy Governor at Sveriges Riksbank.
“Comments on Dale, Orphanides, and Österholm, ‘Imperfect Central Bank Communication: Information versus Distraction,” SNB Research Conference, September 19-20, 2008, slides.
The line: The paper’s argument against publishing central-bank forecasts requires the unlikely combination of (1) the central-bank forecast being much worse than the private-sector forecast and (2) the private-sector incorrectly believing the central-bank forecast is much better.
“The Role of Science in Best-Practice Monetary Policy: In Honor of Otmar Issing,” presented at “Monetary Policy: A Journey from Theory to Practice,” an ECB Colloqium held in honor of Otmar Issing in Frankfurt, March 16-17, 2006, PDF. Abstract.
The line: There is a considerable amount of science in current best-practice monetary policy, but a considerable amount of judgment is also needed., which judgment preferably should be used in a systematic and disciplined way.
“The Instrument-Rate Projection under Inflation Targeting: The Norwegian Example,” in Stability and Economic Growth: The Role of Central Banks, Banco de Mexico, 2006, 175-198, PDF. Abstract.
The line: By publishing optimal projections of the instrument rate, inflation, and the output gap with uncertainty intervals, together with discussion, alternative scenarios, criteria for optimal projections (targeting rules), and cross-checking with alternative policy rules, Norges Bank (the central bank of Norway) has provided a model in transparent flexible inflation targeting for other central banks.
“The Riksbank Should Learn from Norway” (in Swedish), interview in Dagens Industri, January 14, 2006, PDF.
“Comments on ‘Grading the Federal Open Market Committee’s Communications’ by Vincent Reinhart and Brian Sack,” presented at the ASSA meeting in Boston, January 7, 2006, slides.
“Optimal Inflation Targeting: Further Developments of Inflation Targeting,” in Mishkin, Frederic, and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (eds.) (2007), Monetary Policy under Inflation Targeting, Banco Central de Chile, PDF. Abstract.
The line: Substantial progress can be made by inflation-targeting central banks by (1) employing an explicit intertemporal loss function, (2) making explicit decisions on optimal projection paths of the instrument rate, (3) publishing such projections, and (4) incorporating judgment and model uncertainty in a systematic way.
“Social Value of Public Information: Morris and Shin (2002) Is Actually Pro Transparency, Not Con,” American Economic Review 96 (2006) 448-451, PDF. Abstract.
The line: Morris and Shin’s result in their 2002 AER paper has widely been interpreted as an anti-transparency result, but it is actually a pro-transparency result.
“Monetary Policy with Judgment: Forecast Targeting,” International Journal of Central Banking 1(1) (2005) 1-54, PDF. Abstract. Appendix.
The line: Monetary policy that uses central-bank judgment – information, knowledge, and views outside the scope of a particular model – may perform much better than monetary policy that disregards judgment and follows a simple instrument rule.
“Comment on Jeffery D. Amato and Hyun Song Shin, ‘Public and Private Information in Monetary Policy Models’,” revised June 2003, presented at the conference “Monetary Stability, Financial Stability and the Business Cycle,” BIS, Basel, Mar 28-29, 2003, PDF (100 KB).
“An Independent Review of Monetary Policy and Institutions in Norway,” by Lars E.O. Svensson (chair) (Princeton University), Kjetil Houg (Alfred Berg), Haakon Solheim (Norwegian School of Management BI) and Erling Steigum (Norwegian School of Management BI), Norges Bank Watch 2002, Centre for Monetary Economics, Norwegian School of Management BI, September 2002.
“Monetary Policy and Real Stabilization,” September 2002, in Rethinking Stabilization Policy, A Symposium Sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, August 29-31, 2002, 261-312, PDF. Abstract.
“The Inflation Forecast and the Loss Function,” in Paul Mizen, ed. (2003), Central Banking, Monetary Theory and Practice: Essays in Honour of Charles Goodhart, Volume I, Edward Elgar, 135-152. PDF (180 KB). Abstract.
Discussion of Anne Sibert, “Monetary Policy with Uncertain Central Bank Preferences,” presented at ISOM, Dublin, June 8-9, 2001, overhead slides (PDF, 48KB).
Discussion of Blinder, Goodhart, Hildebrand, Lipton and Wyplosz, “How Do Central Banks Talk?” presented at the Third Geneva Conference, Geneva, May 4, 2001, overhead slides (PDF, 30 KB).
“Bristande transparens i ESCBs penningpolitiska strategi” (“Insufficient Transparency in ESCB’s Monetary Policy Stratetegy,” in Swedish), Europafocus Mars 1999.