

## Last time

- Cagan model,

$$m_t - p_t = -\eta(p_{t+1|t} - p_t).$$

Solution (weighted average)

$$p_t = \frac{1}{1 + \eta} \sum_{\tau=0}^{\infty} \left( \frac{\eta}{1 + \eta} \right)^{\tau} m_{t+\tau|t}.$$

Assumptions:

Convergence of series:

$$\left| \lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \sum_{\tau=0}^{T-1} \left( \frac{\eta}{1 + \eta} \right)^{\tau} E_t m_{t+\tau} \right| < \infty,$$

which requires

$$\lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \left( \frac{\eta}{1 + \eta} \right)^T E_t m_{t+T} = 0.$$

Absence of bubble solutions:

$$\lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \left( \frac{\eta}{1 + \eta} \right)^T E_t p_{t+T} = 0.$$

## Why assume absence of bubble solutions?

- Implication

$$\lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \left( \frac{\eta}{1 + \eta} \right)^T E_t (m_{t+T} - p_{t+T}) = 0$$

$p_t$  does not diverge too far from  $m_t$  (still, considerable divergence possible)

- Simplest solution, focal point
- Microfoundations might exclude bubble solutions.

## Empirical support of rational expectations (and this model)? Mixed

- Inherent difficulty: Dependence on conditional distributions rather than actual realizations.  
Joint test of RE and model
- Sargent 93: Sudden inflation stabilization after policy reform. But not sudden change in real balances.
- Expectations formation complex: Information and news other than realized inflation seem to matter.

## 2. An optimizing model of money demand and Friedmans's rule

- Cagan model simple empirical generalization. Microfoundations?
  - Is the Cagan model “structural”?
  - Other determinants of money demand (than  $p_{t+1|t} - p_t$ )?
  - Bubble solutions?
  - Integrate with other aspects of macro model, general equilibrium
  - Welfare analysis of monetary policy
- Sidrauski 67 - Brock 74 model
  - Representative household
  - Money modeled as financial asset, except
    - \* Fixed nominal return at zero (zero not essential)
    - \* Supplies “liquidity services” (by facilitating transactions), modeled as service flow from durable good
    - \* “Money in utility function”
  - Other alternatives:
    - Transactions costs, transactions time
    - Cash in advance
    - Overlapping generations (money is only store of value)
  - Perfect foresight (at first)

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- Household preferences

$$U_t = \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \beta^{s-t} \left[ u \left( C_s, \frac{M_s}{P_s} \right) + v(G_s) \right]$$

$0 < \beta < 1$ ,  $u(C, m)$  concave,  $C \geq 0$ ,  $m \equiv M/P \geq 0$ ,  $u_C > 0$ ,  $u_m \geq 0$  ( $> 0$  up to some possible satiation level  $\bar{m}$ , may depend on  $C$ ), *real* balances;  $v(G)$  additively separable utility of government consumption  $G$

- $u(C_s, \frac{M_s}{P_s})$  indirect utility function
- Simple transactions time interpretation,

$$u_t = \alpha \log C_t + (1 - \alpha) \log (\bar{L} - L_t) .$$

Leisure  $\bar{L} - L_t$ ,  $L_t$  time spent in transations:

$$\bar{L} - L_t = A \left( \frac{M_t/P_t}{C_t} \right)^\varepsilon$$

$$\begin{aligned} u_t &= \alpha \log C_t + (1 - \alpha) \log (\bar{L} - L_t) \\ &= [\alpha - \varepsilon(1 - \alpha)] \log C_t + \varepsilon(1 - \alpha) \log \frac{M_t}{P_t} + (1 - \alpha) \log a \equiv u(C_t, \frac{M_t}{P_t}) \end{aligned}$$

- $u$  increasing in  $M/P$  corresponds to liquidity services from real balances (else not coexist with riskless short nominal bonds with positive  $i_t$ ).

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- Household period budget constraint (=, for simplicity)

Nominal:

$$P_t C_t + M_t + \frac{1}{1+i_t} B_t + P_t \frac{1}{1+r_t} b_t = P_t Y_t - P_t T_t + M_{t-1} + B_{t-1} + P_t b_{t-1}$$

$B_t$  (notation different from Obstfeld-Rogoff) denotes quantity of one-period nominal (riskless) bonds, each pays the equivalent of one unit of money in period  $t+1$ , nominal price  $\frac{1}{1+i_t}$  in period  $t$ ;  $b_t$  denotes quantity of one-period real bonds, each pays the equivalent of one consumption good in period  $t+1$ , real price  $\frac{1}{1+r_t}$  in period  $t$ .

Real:

$$C_t + \frac{M_t}{P_t} + \frac{1}{P_t} \frac{1}{1+i_t} B_t + \frac{1}{1+r_t} b_t = Y_t - T_t + \frac{M_{t-1}}{P_t} + \frac{B_{t-1}}{P_t} + b_{t-1}$$

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- First-order conditions for optimum

$$\max_{\{b_s, B_s, M_s\}_{s=t}^{\infty}} \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \beta^{s-t} \left[ u \left( Y_s - T_s + \frac{M_{s-1}}{P_s} + \frac{B_{s-1}}{P_s} + b_{s-1} - \frac{M_s}{P_s} - \frac{1}{P_s} \frac{1}{1+i_s} B_s - \frac{1}{1+r_s} b_s, \frac{M_s}{P_s} \right) + v(G_s) \right]$$

$b_t$ :

$$\frac{1}{1+r_t} u_C \left( C_t, \frac{M_t}{P_t} \right) = \beta u_C \left( C_{t+1}, \frac{M_{t+1}}{P_{t+1}} \right) \quad (1)$$

$B_t$ :

$$\frac{1}{1+i_t} \frac{1}{P_t} u_C \left( C_t, \frac{M_t}{P_t} \right) = \frac{1}{P_{t+1}} \beta u_C \left( C_{t+1}, \frac{M_{t+1}}{P_{t+1}} \right) \quad (2)$$

$M_t$ :

$$\frac{1}{P_t} u_C \left( C_t, \frac{M_t}{P_t} \right) = \frac{1}{P_t} u_{M/P} \left( C_t, \frac{M_t}{P_t} \right) + \frac{1}{P_{t+1}} \beta u_C \left( C_{t+1}, \frac{M_{t+1}}{P_{t+1}} \right) \quad (3)$$

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- Rewrite as “asset price” conditions:

Real price (in terms of consumption good) of real bond

$$\frac{1}{1+r_t} = \frac{\beta u_C \left( C_{t+1}, \frac{M_{t+1}}{P_{t+1}} \right)}{u_C \left( C_t, \frac{M_t}{P_t} \right)} \quad (4)$$

(Right side  $\equiv$   $-$  MRS of  $C_t$  for  $C_{t+1}$ )

Nominal price (in terms of money) of nominal bond

$$\frac{1}{1+i_t} = \frac{\beta u_C \left( C_{t+1}, \frac{M_{t+1}}{P_{t+1}} \right) / P_{t+1}}{u_C \left( C_t, \frac{M_t}{P_t} \right) / P_t} \quad (5)$$

(Right side  $\equiv$   $-$  MRS of  $P_t C_t$  at  $t$  for  $P_{t+1} C_{t+1}$  at  $t+1$ )

Real price of money

$$\frac{1}{P_t} = \frac{u_{M/P} \left( C_t, \frac{M_t}{P_t} \right) / P_t}{u_C \left( C_t, \frac{M_t}{P_t} \right)} + \frac{\beta u_C \left( C_{t+1}, \frac{M_{t+1}}{P_{t+1}} \right) / P_{t+1}}{u_C \left( C_t, \frac{M_t}{P_t} \right)} \quad (6)$$

(Right side =  $-$  MRS of  $C_t$  for  $M_t$   $-$  MRS of  $C_t$  for  $P_{t+1} C_{t+1}$ )

$$\frac{1}{P_t} = \frac{\beta u_C \left( C_{t+1}, \frac{M_{t+1}}{P_{t+1}} \right) / P_{t+1}}{u_C \left( C_t, \frac{M_t}{P_t} \right) - u_{M/P} \left( C_t, \frac{M_t}{P_t} \right)} \quad (7)$$

( $u_{M/P} < u_C$ )

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From (4) and (5), Fisher equation under perfect foresight

$$\frac{1}{1+i_t} = \frac{P_t/P_{t+1}}{1+r_t} \quad (8)$$

From (5) and (6),

$$\frac{u_{M/P} \left( C_t, \frac{M_t}{P_t} \right)}{u_C \left( C_t, \frac{M_t}{P_t} \right)} = \frac{i_t}{1+i_t} \quad (9)$$

Left side:  $-$ MRS of consumption for real balances

$$\left. \frac{dC_t}{d(M_t/P_t)} \right|_{du_t=0} = - \frac{u_{M/P} \left( C_t, \frac{M_t}{P_t} \right)}{u_C \left( C_t, \frac{M_t}{P_t} \right)}$$

What is the right side?  $-$ MRT?

Introduce total nominal assets in the beginning of period  $t + 1$

$$W_{t+1} = M_t + B_t + P_{t+1}b_t \quad (10)$$

Note that (using (8))

$$\begin{aligned} M_t + \frac{1}{1+i_t}B_t + \frac{1}{1+r_t}P_t b_t &= \frac{i_t}{1+i_t}M_t + \frac{1}{1+i_t}(M_t + B_t) + \frac{1}{1+i_t}P_{t+1}b_t \\ &= \frac{i_t}{1+i_t}M_t + \frac{1}{1+i_t}W_{t+1} \end{aligned}$$

Rewrite the period budget constraint in nominal form,

$$P_t C_t + \frac{i_t}{1+i_t}M_t + \frac{1}{1+i_t}W_{t+1} = P_t Y_t - P_t T_t + W_t, \quad (11)$$

and in real form,

$$C_t + \frac{i_t}{1+i_t} \frac{M_t}{P_t} + \frac{1}{1+i_t} \frac{W_{t+1}}{P_t} = Y_t - T_t + \frac{W_t}{P_t}. \quad (12)$$

The term  $\frac{i_t}{1+i_t}$  can be interpreted as the opportunity cost in period  $t$  of holding real balances (present value in period  $t$  of interest lost in period  $t + 1$ , compared to holding nominal bonds).

MRT of real balances into consumption,

$$\left. \frac{dC_t}{d(M_t/P_t)} \right|_{(12), d(W_{t+1}/P_t)=0} = -\frac{i_t}{1+i_t}$$

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- Intertemporal budget constraint (under perfect foresight). Multiply (12) by real (market) discount factor (present real value in period  $t$  of one unit real value in period  $s$ ,  $s \geq t$ )

$$\begin{aligned} d_{t,t} &= 1 \\ d_{t,s} &\equiv \prod_{\tau=t}^{s-1} \frac{1}{1+r_\tau} = \frac{1}{(1+r_t)(1+r_{t+1})\dots(1+r_{s-1})} \quad (s > t) \end{aligned}$$

and sum (12) from  $s = t$  to  $T > t$ , using (8):

$$\sum_{s=t}^T d_{t,s} \left( C_s + \frac{i_s}{1+i_s} \frac{M_s}{P_s} \right) + d_{t,T} \frac{1}{1+i_T} \frac{W_{T+1}}{P_T} = \sum_{s=t}^T d_{t,s} (Y_s - T_s) + \frac{W_t}{P_t} \quad (13)$$

Assume *no-Ponzi condition*,

$$\sum_{s=t}^{\infty} d_{t,s} (Y_s - T_s) + \frac{W_t}{P_t} \geq 0, \quad \text{for all } t,$$

where we assume

$$\sum_{s=t}^{\infty} d_{t,s} (Y_s - T_s) < \infty.$$

Hence,

$$d_{t,T} \frac{1}{1+i_T} \frac{W_{T+1}}{P_T} = d_{t,T} \frac{1}{1+r_T} \frac{W_{T+1}}{P_{T+1}} \geq -d_{t,T+1} \sum_{s=T+1}^{\infty} d_{T+1,s} (Y_s - T_s),$$

and, used in (13),

$$\sum_{s=t}^T d_{t,s} \left( C_s + \frac{i_s}{1+i_s} \frac{M_s}{P_s} \right) \leq \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} d_{t,s} (Y_s - T_s) + \frac{W_t}{P_t} \quad (13a)$$

(LHS bounded)

Assume *transversality condition* (optimality condition, distinct from no-Ponzi condition),

$$\lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} d_{t,T} \frac{1}{1+i_T} \frac{W_{T+1}}{P_T} = 0. \quad (14)$$

Then, letting  $T \rightarrow \infty$  in (13) gives the real intertemporal budget constraint,

$$\sum_{s=t}^{\infty} d_{t,s} \left( C_s + \frac{i_s}{1+i_s} \frac{M_s}{P_s} \right) = \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} d_{t,s} (Y_s - T_s) + \frac{W_t}{P_t}. \quad (15)$$

(LHS converges)

Note that

$$\sum_{s=t}^{\infty} d_{t,s} \left( C_s + \frac{i_s}{1+i_s} \frac{M_s}{P_s} \right) < \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} d_{t,s} (Y_s - T_s) + \frac{W_t}{P_t}$$

cannot be optimal; therefore (14) is an optimality condition.

The nominal (market) discount factor

$$D_{t,t} = 1$$

$$D_{t,s} \equiv \prod_{\tau=0}^{s-1} \frac{1}{1+i_\tau} \quad (s > t)$$

and the nominal period budget constraint (11) results in the nominal intertemporal budget constraint

$$\sum_{s=t}^{\infty} D_{t,s} \left( P_s C_s + \frac{i_s}{1+i_s} M_s \right) = \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} D_{t,s} P_s (Y_s - T_s) + W_t. \quad (16)$$

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- Money demand. Solve (9) for  $\frac{M_t}{P_t}$ :

$$\frac{M_t}{P_t} = L(C_t, i_t)$$

– Isoelastic utility function

$$u \left( C, \frac{M}{P} \right) = \frac{\left[ C^\gamma (M/P)^{1-\gamma} \right]^{1-\frac{1}{\sigma}} - 1}{1 - \frac{1}{\sigma}}$$

$$\frac{M_t}{P_t} = \frac{1-\gamma}{\gamma} C_t \frac{1+i_t}{i_t}$$

– CES utility function

$$u \left( C, \frac{M}{P} \right) = \frac{\left\{ \left[ \gamma^{\frac{1}{\eta}} C^{1-\frac{1}{\eta}} + (1-\gamma)^{\frac{1}{\eta}} \left( \frac{M}{P} \right)^{1-\frac{1}{\eta}} \right]^{\frac{\eta}{\eta-1}} \right\}^{1-\frac{1}{\sigma}} - 1}{1 - \frac{1}{\sigma}}$$

$$\frac{M_t}{P_t} = \frac{1-\gamma}{\gamma} C_t \left( \frac{i_t}{1+i_t} \right)^{-\eta}$$

(Note  $\eta \rightarrow 1!$ )

Not identical to Cagan's:

$$\frac{M_t}{P_t} \sim A(1+i_t)^{-\eta}$$

$$\log M_t - \log P_t = \log A - \eta \log(1+i_t)$$

$$= \log A - \eta [\log(1+r) + \log P_{t+1|t} - \log P_t]$$

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- Government budget constraint (for simplicity, drop real bonds)  
Consolidated budget constraint, fiscal authority (FA) and central bank (CB)

$$P_t G_t + B_{t-1} = M_t - M_{t-1} + \frac{1}{1+i_t} B_t + P_t T_t \quad (17)$$

$$\text{“Seignorage”} = \frac{M_t - M_{t-1}}{P_t}$$

Budget constraint in terms of total government liabilities (10)

$$P_t G_t + W_t = \frac{1}{1+i_t} W_{t+1} + \frac{i_t}{1+i_t} M_t + P_t T_t \quad (18)$$

$$\text{“Seignorage”} = \frac{i_t}{1+i_t} \frac{M_t}{P_t}$$

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Split up government in FA and CB

FA budget constraint

$$P_t G_t + B_{t-1}^g = \frac{1}{1+i_t} B_t^g + P_t T_t + P_t z_t \quad (19)$$

$B_t^g$  nominal bonds issued by FA in period  $t$ ,  $P_t z_t$  surplus delivered by CB

CB budget constraint

$$P_t z_t + \frac{1}{1+i_t} B_t^c = M_t - M_{t-1} + B_{t-1}^c \quad (20)$$

$B_t^c$  is quantity of nominal bonds held by CB at end of period  $t$

$B_t$  is quantity of nominal bonds held by households at end of period  $t$

$$B_t = B_t^g - B_t^c$$

Adding (19) and (20) gives (17).

Suppose central bank has no capital: Assets  $B_t^c =$  liabilities  $M_t$

$$B_t^c = M_t$$

Use in (20)

$$P_t z_t = \frac{i_t}{1+i_t} M_t$$

$$\text{“Seignorage”} = \frac{i_t}{1+i_t} \frac{M_t}{P_t}$$

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- Market equilibrium conditions (in closed economy)

Goods market equilibrium

$$C_t + G_t = Y_t \tag{21}$$

Money market equilibrium already assumed ( $M_t = M_t^d = M_t^s$ )

Nominal bond market equilibrium already assumed ( $B_t = B_t^d = B_t^s$ )

Real bonds,  $b_t = b_t^d = b_t^s = 0$ , still price (determine  $r_t$ )

- Equilibrium is sequence  $\{Y_t, C_t, G_t, T_t, B_t, M_t, P_t, i_t, r_t\}$  fulfilling

- Budget constraints (period or intertemporal)
  - \* Private sector
  - \* Government (consolidated)
- Private-sector FOCs (pricing equations for  $r_t, i_t, 1/P_t$ )
- No-Ponzi condition
- Transversality condition
- Market equilibrium conditions
- Walras Law, redundancy

- Exogenous and endogenous depends

- Exogenous:  $Y_t, G_t, T_t, M_t$
- Endogenous:  $C_t, B_t, P_t, i_t, r_t$
- Alternatives
- Optimizing policy
  - \* Fiscal policy:  $G_t, T_t$  endogenous; first-order condition; fiscal objective function, could be “welfare”
  - \* Monetary policy:  $M_t$  endogenous; first-order condition; monetary-policy loss function, could be “welfare”



- Bubbles and self-fulfilling expectations, inflation and deflation

Assume  $G_t = 0, Y_t = Y$  constant

Assume exogenous constant gross money supply growth

$$M_t = M_0 \mu^t$$

Combine this with (7) to get

$$[u_C(Y, m_t) - u_m(Y, m_t)]m_t = \frac{\beta}{\mu} u_C(Y, m_{t+1}) m_{t+1}$$

where  $m_t \equiv M_t/P_t$ .

Nonlinear difference equation

$$F(m_t) = \frac{\beta}{\mu} G(m_{t+1})$$

where

$$F(m) \equiv [u_C(Y, m) - u_m(Y, m)]m$$

$$G(m) \equiv u_C(Y, m) m$$

and transversality condition (from (14)) (show!)

$$\lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \beta^T G(m_T) = 0 \tag{22}$$

Forward-looking solution:  $m_t$  depends on  $m_{t+1}$  which depends on  $m_{t+2} \dots$

One solution:

$$m_t = m^*$$

$$F(m^*) = \frac{\beta}{\mu} G(m^*)$$

$$\frac{u_m(Y, m^*)}{u_C(Y, m^*)} = 1 - \frac{\beta}{\mu}$$

$$P_t = \frac{M_t}{m^*} = \frac{M_0}{m^*} \mu^t$$

Exists if  $\mu > \beta$  and for  $\mu = \beta$  if  $u_m(Y, m^*) = 0$ ,  $m^*$  satiation level

Corresponds to non-bubble solution.

Other solutions?

Special case in Obstfeld-Rogoff:  $u(C, m) = U(C) + V(m)$ ;  $U(C), V(m)$  concave

– “Hyperdeflation”:  $m^* < m_0 < m_1 < \dots$

$m_t \rightarrow \infty, P_t \rightarrow 0$


*Not possible* if  $m_t$  bounded from above,  $m_t < \bar{m}$  for some  $\bar{m}$  (limited resources (and  $B_t \geq 0!$ ))

– “Hyperinflation”:  $m^* > m_0 > m_1 > \dots$

$m_t \rightarrow 0, P_t \rightarrow \infty$ .

Depends on shape of  $F(m)$  and  $G(m)$  when  $m \rightarrow 0$ . Possible in figure below.

*Not possible* if central bank “backs” currency and offers to trade it for real goods/assets at some low value  $1/\bar{P}$  (high  $\bar{P}$ ) (Obstfeld-Rogoff)



– (How do we know that  $F'(m) > \frac{\beta}{\mu} G'(m)$  for  $m = m^*$ ?)

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• Two measures of seignorage

$$\begin{aligned}
 S_t^1 &\equiv \frac{M_t - M_{t-1}}{P_t} \\
 &= \frac{M_t}{P_t} - \frac{M_{t-1}}{P_{t-1}} + \frac{M_{t-1}}{P_{t-1}} - \frac{P_{t-1} M_{t-1}}{P_t P_{t-1}} \\
 &= m_t - m_{t-1} + \left(1 - \frac{P_{t-1}}{P_t}\right) m_{t-1} \\
 &= m_t - m_{t-1} - \frac{1/P_t - 1/P_{t-1}}{1/P_{t-1}} m_{t-1}
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 S_t^2 &\equiv \frac{i_t}{1 + i_t} m_t \\
 &= \frac{(1 + r_t) P_{t+1}/P_t - 1}{(1 + r_t) P_{t+1}/P_t} m_t \\
 &= \left(1 - \frac{P_t}{(1 + r_t) P_{t+1}}\right) m_t
 \end{aligned}$$

$$S_t^1 \neq S_t^2$$

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Suppose  $M_t = M_0\mu^t$ ,  $P_t = P_0\mu^t$ ,  $m_t \equiv \frac{M_t}{P_t} = m$ :

$$S_t^1 = \left(1 - \frac{1}{\mu}\right)m$$

$$S_t^2 = \left(1 - \frac{1}{(1+r)\mu}\right)m$$

Suppose  $\mu = 1$ :

$$S_t^1 = 0$$

$$S_t^2 = \left(1 - \frac{1}{1+r}\right)m > 0 \quad (r > 0)$$

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- Stochastic states of the world, complete state-contingent markets (Woodford 03-2)

Household budget constraint in period  $t$

$$P_t C_t + M_t + \tilde{B}_t \leq P_t Y_t - P_t T_t + W_t$$

$$W_t = M_{t-1} + A_t$$

$$\tilde{B}_t = E_t Q_{t,t+1} A_{t+1}$$

$W_t$  beginning-of-period state-dependent nominal value of household's financial wealth

$A_t$  beginning-of-period state-dependent nominal value of household's financial assets other than money

$Q_{t,t+1}$  state-dependent market discount factor ( $s^{t+1} = (s_0, s_1, \dots, s_{t+1})$ ,  $s_t \in S$ ), present nominal value in period  $t$  of one unit of account in period  $t+1$ ,  $Q_{t,t} = 1$

$\tilde{B}_t$  end-of-period value of household's financial assets other than money

Present value in period  $t$  of one riskless unit of account in period  $t+1$

$$\frac{1}{1+i_t} = E_t Q_{t,t+1}$$

$$E_t Q_{t,t+1} W_{t+1} = E_t Q_{t,t+1} (M_t + A_{t+1}) = \frac{1}{1+i_t} M_t + \tilde{B}_t$$

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Rewrite budget constraint

$$P_t C_t + \frac{i_t}{1+i_t} M_t + E_t Q_{t,t+1} W_{t+1} \leq P_t Y_t - P_t T_t + W_t$$

No-Ponzi condition

$$W_{t+1} \geq -E_{t+1} \sum_{s=t+1}^{\infty} Q_{t+1,s} (P_s Y_s - P_s T_s)$$

$$E_{t+1} \sum_{s=t+1}^{\infty} Q_{t+1,s} (P_s Y_s - P_s T_s) < \infty$$

where  $Q_{t,T} = \prod_{s=t}^{T-1} Q_{s,s+1}$ .

Transversality condition

$$\lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} E_t Q_{t,T} W_T = 0$$

Intertemporal budget constraint

$$E_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} Q_{t,s} \left( P_s C_s + \frac{i_s}{1+i_s} M_s \right) = E_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} Q_{t,s} (P_s Y_s - P_s T_s) + W_t$$

Preferences ( $\xi_s$  exogenous random preference shock in period  $s$ )

$$U_t = E_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \beta^{s-t} \left[ u \left( C_s, \frac{M_s}{P_s}, \xi_s \right) + v(G_s, \xi_s) \right]$$

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Discount factor

$$Q_{t,t+1} = \frac{\beta u_C \left( C_{t+1}, \frac{M_{t+1}}{P_{t+1}}, \xi_{t+1} \right) / P_{t+1}}{u_C \left( C_t, \frac{M_t}{P_t}, \xi_t \right) / P_t}$$

- Substitute for  $C_t$ , take FOCs for  $W_{t+1}$
- Lagrangian, FOCs

$$U_{C_t} = \lambda P_t$$

$$U_{C_{t+1}} = \lambda P_{t+1} Q_{t,t+1}$$

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Real price of real bond

$$\frac{1}{1+r_t} = E_t Q_{t,t+1} P_{t+1}/P_t = \frac{\beta E_t u_C \left( C_{t+1}, \frac{M_{t+1}}{P_{t+1}}, \xi_{t+1} \right)}{u_C \left( C_t, \frac{M_t}{P_t}, \xi_t \right)} \quad (23)$$

Nominal price of nominal bond

$$\frac{1}{1+i_t} = E_t Q_{t,t+1} = \frac{\beta E_t \left[ u_C \left( C_{t+1}, \frac{M_{t+1}}{P_{t+1}}, \xi_{t+1} \right) / P_{t+1} \right]}{u_C \left( C_t, \frac{M_t}{P_t}, \xi_t \right) / P_t} \quad (24)$$

Real value of money

$$\frac{1}{P_t} = \frac{u_{M/P} \left( C_t, \frac{M_t}{P_t}, \xi_t \right) / P_t}{u_C \left( C_t, \frac{M_t}{P_t}, \xi_t \right)} + \frac{\beta E_t \left[ u_C \left( C_{t+1}, \frac{M_{t+1}}{P_{t+1}}, \xi_{t+1} \right) / P_{t+1} \right]}{u_C \left( C_t, \frac{M_t}{P_t}, \xi_t \right)} \quad (25)$$

$$\frac{1}{P_t} = \frac{\beta E_t \left[ u_C \left( C_{t+1}, \frac{M_{t+1}}{P_{t+1}}, \xi_{t+1} \right) / P_{t+1} \right]}{u_C \left( C_t, \frac{M_t}{P_t}, \xi_t \right) - u_{M/P} \left( C_t, \frac{M_t}{P_t}, \xi_t \right)} \quad (26)$$

Fisher equation under uncertainty, combine (23) and (24), (8) no longer exact (inflation risk premium, covariance, Jensen's inequality).

$$\frac{1+i_t}{1+r_t} = \frac{E_t u_C \left( C_{t+1}, \frac{M_{t+1}}{P_{t+1}}, \xi_{t+1} \right)}{E_t \left[ u_C \left( C_{t+1}, \frac{M_{t+1}}{P_{t+1}}, \xi_{t+1} \right) P_t / P_{t+1} \right]}$$

Equation (9) holds under uncertainty

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- The Fisher equation under uncertainty

$$\ln(1+i_t) = -\ln \frac{\beta E_t \left[ u_C \left( C_{t+1}, \frac{M_{t+1}}{P_{t+1}}, \xi_{t+1} \right) / P_{t+1} \right]}{u_C \left( C_t, \frac{M_t}{P_t}, \xi_t \right) / P_t} = -\ln E_t q_{t,t+1} / \frac{P_{t+1}}{P_t}$$

$$\ln(1+r_t) = -\ln \frac{\beta E_t u_C \left( C_{t+1}, \frac{M_{t+1}}{P_{t+1}}, \xi_{t+1} \right)}{u_C \left( C_t, \frac{M_t}{P_t}, \xi_t \right)} = -\ln E_t q_{t,t+1}$$

Real discount factor  $q_{t,t+1} \equiv \frac{\beta u_C \left( C_{t+1}, \frac{M_{t+1}}{P_{t+1}}, \xi_{t+1} \right)}{u_C \left( C_t, \frac{M_t}{P_t}, \xi_t \right)}$ . Assume  $q_{t,t+1}$  and  $\frac{P_{t+1}}{P_t}$  jointly lognormal ( $u_C \left( C_t, \frac{M_t}{P_t}, \xi_t \right)$  and  $P_t$  known in period  $t$ ) and use the results:

– For  $x$  normal (show!),

$$E[\exp x] = \exp(E[x] + \frac{1}{2} \text{Var}[x]).$$

It follows that for  $x$  and  $y$  jointly lognormal,

$$\begin{aligned} E[x] &= \exp \left( E[\ln x] + \frac{1}{2} \text{Var}[\ln x] \right) \\ E[xy] &= E[x]E[y] \exp(\text{Cov}[\ln x, \ln y]) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\pi_{t+1} &\equiv \ln \frac{P_{t+1}}{P_t} \equiv p_{t+1} - p_t \\
\ln(1 + r_t) &= -\ln E_t q_{t,t+1} \\
\ln(1 + i_t) &= -\ln E_t \left[ q_{t,t+1} \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1}} \right] \\
&= -\ln \left( E_t[q_{t,t+1}] E_t \left[ \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1}} \right] \exp\{\text{Cov}_t[\ln q_{t,t+1}, -\pi_{t+1}]\} \right) \\
&= -\ln E_t q_{t,t+1} - \ln E_t \left[ \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1}} \right] + \text{Cov}_t[\ln q_{t,t+1}, \pi_{t+1}] \\
&= -\ln E_t q_{t,t+1} - \ln \exp \left( E_t \left[ \ln \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1}} \right] + \frac{1}{2} \text{Var}_t \left[ \ln \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1}} \right] \right) \\
&\quad + \text{Cov}_t[\ln q_{t,t+1}, \pi_{t+1}] \\
&= \ln(1 + r_t) + E_t \pi_{t+1} - \frac{1}{2} \text{Var}_t [\pi_{t+1}] + \text{Cov}_t[\ln q_{t,t+1}, \pi_{t+1}] \tag{27}
\end{aligned}$$

Inflation risk premium

$$-\frac{1}{2} \text{Var}_t [\pi_{t+1}] + \text{Cov}_t[\ln q_{t,t+1}, \pi_{t+1}]$$

(see Svensson 93 for more on term, inflation, and foreign exchange risk premia)

Disregard inflation risk premium, approximate Fisher equation

$$\ln(1 + i_t) = \ln(1 + r_t) + E_t \pi_{t+1}$$

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- Relation between stochastic nominal discount factors  $Q_{t,\tau}$  and prices of Arrow-Debreu history-contingent contracts

Stochastic events  $s_\tau \in S$  in period  $\tau \geq t$ , finite for simplicity

History  $s_t^\tau = (s_t, s_{t+1}, \dots, s_\tau) \in S^{\tau-t+1}$  up to and including period  $\tau \geq t$

$\pi_{t,\tau}(s_t^\tau)$  probability of  $s_t^\tau$  conditional on  $s_t$

Consumption  $C_\tau$  of one consumption good in period  $\tau$ , real balances  $m_\tau$ , subjective discount factor  $\beta$  ( $0 < \beta < 1$ )

Expected utility ( $G_t \equiv 0$ )

$$E \left[ \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \beta^{\tau-t} u(C_\tau, m_\tau, s_\tau) \middle| s_t \right] = \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \sum_{s_t^\tau \in S^\tau} \beta^{\tau-t} u[C_\tau(s_t^\tau), m_\tau(s_t^\tau), s_\tau] \pi_{t,\tau}(s_t^\tau)$$

Assume complete markets

$\tilde{p}_{t,\tau}(s_t^\tau)$  Arrow-Debreu price, price of delivery of one consumption good in history  $s_t^\tau$  in period  $\tau$  in terms of consumption goods in period  $t$  and event  $s_t$

In equilibrium

$$\tilde{p}_{t,\tau}(s_t^\tau) = \frac{\beta^{\tau-t} u_C[C_\tau(s_t^\tau), m_\tau(s_t^\tau), s_\tau] \pi_{t,\tau}(s_t^\tau)}{u_C[C_t(s_t), m_t(s_t), s_t]}$$

$Q_{t,\tau}(s_t^\tau)$  history-contingent nominal discount factor

In equilibrium

$$Q_{t,\tau}(s_t^\tau) = \frac{\beta^{\tau-t} u_C[C_\tau(s_t^\tau), m_\tau(s_t^\tau), s_\tau] / P_\tau(s_t^\tau)}{u_C[C_t(s_t), m_t(s_t), s_t] / P_t(s_t)}$$

(where  $P_\tau(s_t^\tau)$  is the nominal price of consumption goods in period  $\tau$ )

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Thus, the Arrow-Debreu prices and the nominal discount factors are related according to

$$\begin{aligned}\tilde{p}_{t,\tau}(s_t^\tau) &= Q_{t,\tau}(s_t^\tau) \frac{P_\tau(s_t^\tau)}{P_t(s_t)} \pi_{t,\tau}(s_t^\tau), \\ \tilde{p}_{t,t}(s_t) &= 1.\end{aligned}$$

It follows that the intertemporal budget constraint in terms of  $E_t$  and  $Q_{t,\tau}$ ,

$$E_t \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} Q_{t,\tau} P_\tau \left( C_\tau + \frac{i_\tau}{1+i_\tau} m_\tau \right) = E_t \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} Q_{t,\tau} P_\tau (Y_\tau - T_\tau) + W_t,$$

is equivalent to the Arrow-Debreu budget constraint,

$$\begin{aligned}\sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \sum_{s_t^\tau \in S^\tau} \tilde{p}_{t,\tau}(s_t^\tau) \left( C_\tau(s_t^\tau) + \frac{i_\tau}{1+i_\tau}(s_t^\tau) m_\tau(s_t^\tau) \right) \\ = \sum_{\tau=t}^{\infty} \sum_{s_t^\tau \in S^\tau} \tilde{p}_{t,\tau}(s_t^\tau) [Y_\tau(s_t^\tau) - T_\tau(s_t^\tau)] + \frac{W_t}{P_t(s_t)}.\end{aligned}$$

AD market structure: All markets in period 0. No bonds, etc. (redundant) (money?).

**Friedman's rule** Socially optimal real balances, “the optimum quantity of money”

Supply money at zero real cost (approximately)

$$\max_{\frac{M_t}{P_t}} u\left(C_t, \frac{M_t}{P_t}\right)$$

Assume there exists a satiation level for real balances (may depend on  $C_t$ )

$$U_{M/P}(C_t, \frac{M_t}{P_t}) = 0$$

From (9), optimum quantity of money

$$\frac{M_t}{P_t} = \min L(C_t, 0)$$

Friedman's 69 rule,

$$i_t \equiv 0$$

Consequences

Under perfect foresight, from (8),  $i_t = 0 \Rightarrow$

$$\frac{P_{t+1}}{P_t} = \frac{1}{1 + r_t}$$

( $r_t > 0 \Rightarrow$  deflation)

Under uncertainty, from (27),  $i_t = 0 \Rightarrow$

$$E_t \pi_{t+1} = -\ln(1 + r_t) + \frac{1}{2} \text{Var}_t[\pi_{t+1}] - \text{Cov}_t[\ln q_{t,t+1}, \pi_{t+1}]$$

- Seignorage, Phelps: optimal inflation tax (Walsh 03 sect. 4.4)
- Welfare gain of going to the Friedman rule (Lucas 00, problem in extending money-demand function beyond observations)
- Cf. deflation and liquidity trap in Japan (to be discussed later). Role for monetary policy in stabilizing economy?