

Inflation Targeting

Lars E.O. Svensson
larseosvensson.se

October 2014

Outline

3 Theory

- Central role of projections
- Policy choice: Choice of interest-rate path, **not** policy function, in feasible set of projections
- Targeting rules
- Implementation of policy and equilibrium determination
- Uncertainty: State of the economy (additive), the transmission mechanism (model, multiplicative)
- Judgment

Outline

4 Practice

- Publishing a policy-rate path
- Case studies: The Riksbank and Norges Bank (Fed could now be added!)
- Preconditions for emerging-market economics

5 Future

- (Price-level targeting)
- (Inflation targeting and financial stability: Lessons from the financial crisis)

6 Conclusions

Outline

(in Friedman and Woodford, eds., *Handbook of Monetary Economics*, Volume 3b, chapt. 22, Elsevier, 2010)

1 Introduction: Inflation targeting

- 1 An announced numerical inflation target
- 2 Forecast targeting, flexible inflation targeting: Choose policy rate path so forecast of inflation and real economy “looks good” (stabilizes inflation around target and resource utilization around normal)
- 3 A high degree of transparency and accountability

2 History and macroeconomic effects


- Starts 1990 in NZ, now about 25 countries
- Effects on inflation, inflation expectations, and output
- Success: Flexible, resilient, and robust monetary-policy regime

2 History and macroeconomic effects

- Inflation targeting starts 1990 in New Zealand
- Bundesbank inflation targeter in disguise?
- Now about 10 advanced and 15 emerging-market and developing countries

2 History and macroeconomic effects

Average yearly inflation
OECD




2 History: Approximate adoption dates

Country	Date	Country	Date
New Zealand	1990 q1	Korea	2001 m1
Canada	1991 m2	Mexico	2001 m1
United Kingdom	1992 m10	Iceland	2001 m3
Sweden	1993 m1	Norway	2001 m3
Finland	1993 m2	Hungary	2001 m6
Australia	1993 m4	Peru	2002 m1
Spain	1995 m1	Philippines	2002 m1
Israel	1997 m6	Guatemala	2005 m1
Czech Republic	1997 m12	Slovakia	2005 m1
Poland	1998 m10	Indonesia	2005 m7
Brazil	1999 m6	Romania	2005 m8
Chile	1999 m9	Turkey	2006 m1
Colombia	1999 m9	Serbia	2006 m9
South Africa	2000 m2	Ghana	2007 m5
Thailand	2000 m5	Albania	(2009 m1)
		U.S.	2012 m1

2 History and macroeconomic effects

Average yearly inflation
Emerging economies



2 History and macroeconomic effects

Changes in expected inflation in response to changes in actual inflation in emerging market economies

	1 year	3 years	5 years	6-10 years
Inflation targeters	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.024
Non-inflation targeters	0.23	0.12	0.07	0.00

Note: Expected inflation 1, 3, 5, and 6–10 years ahead; percentage-point responses to a 1 percentage point change in actual inflation.
Source: International Monetary Fund (2008, figure 3.12)


2 History and macroeconomic effects

- Effects on inflation, inflation expectations, and output for advanced and emerging-market countries
- Success: Flexible, robust, and resilient monetary-policy regime

2 History and macroeconomic effects

Output performance before and after implementation of inflation targeting

For non-targeters the cut of years are 1998 (OECD) and 2001 (EM)



3 Theory

Linear quadratic model (approximation around stochastic steady state)

$$\begin{bmatrix} X_{t+1} \\ Hx_{t+1|t} \end{bmatrix} = A \begin{bmatrix} X_t \\ x_t \end{bmatrix} + B i_t + \begin{bmatrix} C \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} \varepsilon_{t+1} \quad (1)$$

X_t predetermined, x_t forward-looking variables, i_t (policy) instruments, $x_{t+1|t} \equiv E_t x_{t+1}$, ε_t i.i.d. zero-mean shocks

x_t determined by $x_{t+1|t}$, X_t , i_t :

$$\begin{aligned} Hx_{t+1|t} &= A_{21}X_t + A_{22}x_t + B_2 i_t \\ x_t &= A_{22}^{-1}(Hx_{t+1|t} - A_{21}X_t - B_2 i_t) \end{aligned}$$

X_{t+1} determined by X_t , x_t , i_t , ε_{t+1} :

$$X_{t+1} = A_{11}X_t + A_{12}x_t + B_1 i_t + C \varepsilon_{t+1}$$

3 Theory

Example: New Keynesian model (indexing to average inflation, $\bar{\pi} \equiv E[\pi_t]$; credible inflation target, $E[\pi_t] = \pi^*$)

$$\begin{aligned}\pi_t - \bar{\pi} &= \delta(\pi_{t+1|t} - \bar{\pi}) + \kappa(y_t - \bar{y}_t) + \xi_t \\ \xi_{t+1} &= \rho_u \xi_t + \varepsilon_{\xi,t+1} \\ y_t - \bar{y}_t &= (y_{t+1|t} - \bar{y}_{t+1|t}) - \sigma(i_t - \pi_{t+1|t} - \bar{r}_t) \\ \bar{r}_{t+1} &= \rho_r \bar{r}_t + \varepsilon_{r,t+1} \\ (\bar{y}_{t+1|t} - \bar{y}_t) &= \sigma \bar{r}_t\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}X_t &= (1, \xi_t, \bar{r}_t)' \\ x_t &= (\pi_t, y_t - \bar{y}_t)' \\ i_t &= i_t \\ \varepsilon_t &= (\varepsilon_{\xi t}, \varepsilon_{rt})'\end{aligned}$$

3 Theory

Optimization under commitment in a timeless perspective, solution:

$$\begin{bmatrix} x_t \\ i_t \end{bmatrix} = F \begin{bmatrix} X_t \\ \Xi_{t-1} \end{bmatrix} \equiv \begin{bmatrix} F_x \\ F_i \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} X_t \\ \Xi_{t-1} \end{bmatrix} \quad (5)$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} X_{t+1} \\ \Xi_t \end{bmatrix} = M \begin{bmatrix} X_t \\ \Xi_{t-1} \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} C \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} \varepsilon_{t+1} \quad (6)$$

$$Y_t = D \begin{bmatrix} I & 0 \\ & F \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} X_t \\ \Xi_{t-1} \end{bmatrix} \equiv \tilde{D} \begin{bmatrix} X_t \\ \Xi_{t-1} \end{bmatrix} \quad (7)$$

Ξ_t Lagrange multipliers for lower block of (1)

Optimal instrument rule (optimal policy function),

$$i_t = F_i \begin{bmatrix} X_t \\ \Xi_{t-1} \end{bmatrix} \quad (8)$$

Certainty equivalence:

Matrices F and M depend on A, B, H, D, Λ , and δ , but not on C

3 Theory

Y_t target variables, typically $Y_t \equiv (\pi_t - \pi^*, y_t - \bar{y}_t, \dots)'$

$$Y_t = D \begin{bmatrix} X_t \\ x_t \\ i_t \end{bmatrix} \quad (2)$$

Intertemporal loss function

$$E_t \sum_{\tau=0}^{\infty} \delta^\tau L_{t+\tau} \quad (0 < \delta < 1) \quad (3)$$

Period loss

$$L_t \equiv Y_t' \Lambda Y_t \quad (4)$$

Λ weight matrix, typically $\Lambda \equiv \text{Diag}(1, \lambda, \dots)$

$$L_t = (\pi_t - \pi^*)^2 + \lambda(y_t - \bar{y}_t)^2$$

3 Theory

Standard theory of (optimal) monetary policy:

- Central bank commits to some (optimal) policy function F_i
- Private sector combines policy function with model, solves for rational-expectations equilibrium

Not in practice:

- Inflation-targeting central bank chooses and announces current policy rate, indicates or announces path of future policy rate, publishes forecast of inflation and the real economy
- Private sector responds to this information, and the actual equilibrium results
- Forecasts and projections of the policy rate, inflation, and the real economy take center stage

How to model and understand?

3 Theory

- All inflation-targeting central banks not well described by this theory
- Theory is idealization (like consumption theory of actual consumer behavior)
- Theory of mature inflation targeting, potential best-practice inflation targeting
- Actual inflation targeting, w/ one innovation after the other, moving in this direction
- Some inflation-targeting central banks may be pretty close

3.2 Projection model; feasible set of projections

- $u^t \equiv \{u_{t+\tau,t}\}_{\tau=0}^{\infty}$ projection (conditional mean forecast) in period t
- Projection model for the projections (X^t, x^t, i^t, Y^t) in period t ($\varepsilon_{t+\tau,t} = 0$ for $\tau \geq 1$)

$$\begin{bmatrix} X_{t+\tau+1,t} \\ Hx_{t+\tau+1,t} \end{bmatrix} = A \begin{bmatrix} X_{t+\tau,t} \\ x_{t+\tau,t} \end{bmatrix} + Bi_{t+\tau,t} \quad (9)$$

$$Y_{t+\tau,t} = D \begin{bmatrix} X_{t+\tau,t} \\ x_{t+\tau,t} \\ i_{t+\tau,t} \end{bmatrix} \quad (10)$$

$$X_{t,t} = X_{t|t} \quad (11)$$

$X_{t|t}$ estimate of predetermined variables in period t (allows for imperfectly observed state of the economy)

- $\mathcal{T}(X_{t|t})$ feasible set of projections for given $X_{t|t}$, the set of projections (X^t, x^t, i^t, Y^t) that satisfy (9)-(11)

3 Theory

Some misunderstandings to be avoided:

Two things that inflation targeting is not (cf. Orphanides)

- Not *strict* inflation targeting, not $L_t = (\pi_t - \pi^*)^2$.
In practice always *flexible* inflation targeting (but not necessarily transparent).
- Not simple policy rule, such that $i_t = \alpha(\pi_t - \pi^*)$ or $i_t - i_{t-1} = \alpha(\pi_t - \pi^*)$.
Instead, inflation targeting implies that central banks respond to much more information, namely all information that affects the forecast of inflation and the real economy (resource utilization)

3.3 Optimal policy choice

- Policy problem in t : Determine optimal projection $(\hat{X}^t, \hat{x}^t, \hat{i}^t, \hat{Y}^t)$, projection that minimizes intertemporal forecast loss function,

$$\mathcal{L}(Y^t) = \sum_{\tau=0}^{\infty} \delta^\tau L_{t+\tau,t} \quad (0 < \delta \leq 1), \quad (12)$$

subject to $(X^t, x^t, i^t, Y^t) \in \mathcal{T}(X_{t|t})$

Period forecast loss

$$L_{t+\tau,t} \equiv Y_{t+\tau,t}' \Lambda Y_{t+\tau,t} \quad (13)$$

- Optimization under commitment in timeless perspective, modified loss function (Svensson-Woodford 05)

$$\min_{i^t, Y^t} \left\{ \mathcal{L}(Y^t) + \frac{1}{\delta} \Xi'_{t-1} H(x_{t,t} - x_{t,t-1}) \right\} \text{ s.t. } (X^t, x^t, i^t, Y^t) \in \mathcal{T}(X_{t|t}) \quad (14)$$

3.3 Optimal policy choice

- Alternative implementation of timeless perspective (Giannoni-Woodford 02, Svensson-Woodford 05): **Restriction** instead of modified loss function

$$x_{t,t} = F_x \begin{bmatrix} X_{t|t} \\ \Xi_{t-1} \end{bmatrix} \quad (15)$$

$\mathcal{T}(X_{t|t}, \Xi_{t-1})$, the **restricted feasible set of projections**, the subset of the feasible set of projections $\mathcal{T}(X_{t|t})$ that satisfy (15) for given $X_{t|t}$ and Ξ_{t-1}

- Optimal policy projection is also the solution to the problem

$$\min_{i^t, Y^t} \mathcal{L}(Y^t) \text{ subject to } (X^t, x^t, i^t, Y^t) \in \mathcal{T}(X_{t|t}, \Xi_{t-1}) \quad (16)$$

3.6 Targeting rules

- Targeting rule on general form (Giannoni-Woodford 09, Svensson 99)

$$\sum_{s=-a}^b g_s Y_{t+s+\tau, t} = 0 \quad (\tau \geq 0)$$

- Simplest New Keynesian model (Svensson-Woodford 05)


$$\pi_{t+\tau, t} - \pi^* + \frac{\lambda}{\kappa} [(y_{t+\tau, t} - \bar{y}_{t+\tau, t}) - (y_{t+\tau-1, t} - \bar{y}_{t+\tau-1, t})] = 0$$

- Simple, robust, and practical way to characterize optimal policy in small models
- Complex in larger models
- Arguably, for practical policy, policymakers need to look at graphs only

3.4 The forecast Taylor curve

$$\mathcal{L}(Y^t) = \sum_{\tau=0}^{\infty} \delta^\tau (\pi_{t+\tau, t} - \pi^*)^2 + \lambda \sum_{\tau=0}^{\infty} \delta^\tau (y_{t+\tau, t} - \bar{y}_{t+\tau, t})^2 \quad (17)$$

Sums of discounted squared inflation and output gaps (forecasts)



3.7 Implementation and equilibrium determination

Determination of equilibrium?

Period t :

- Central bank chooses and announces forecast $(\hat{X}^t, \hat{x}^t, \hat{i}^t, \hat{Y}^t)$ and sets $i_t = \hat{i}_{t,t}$
- Private sector believes forecast: $x_{t+1|t} = x_{t+1,t}$
- Private sector determines x_t given $x_{t+1|t}$, X_t , and i_t :

$$\begin{aligned} Hx_{t+1|t} &= A_{21}X_t + A_{22}x_t + B_2i_t \\ x_t &= A_{22}^{-1}(Hx_{t+1|t} - A_{21}X_t - B_2i_t) \end{aligned}$$

Period $t+1$:

- Private sector determines X_{t+1} given X_t , x_t , i_t , and ε_{t+1}

$$X_{t+1} = A_{11}X_t + A_{12}x_t + B_1i_t + C\varepsilon_{t+1}$$

3.7 Implementation and equilibrium determination

Determinacy/uniqueness of rational-expectations equilibrium?

- Implicit out-of-equilibrium commitment (Svensson-Woodford 05), for instance,

$$\hat{i}_t = \hat{i}_{t,t} + \varphi(\pi_t - \pi_{t,t})$$

- Svensson-Woodford 05: $\varphi > 1$ (Taylor Principle) ensures determinacy

3.8 Optimization under discretion

- The discretion equilibrium
- Degrees of commitment (Schaumburg and Tambalotti 07)

3. Theory

Main point of theory:

- Central bank does **not** choose and communicate a **policy function**,

$$\begin{aligned} i_t &= f_X X_t + f_x x_t \\ i_t &= f_\pi(\pi_t - \pi^*) + f_y(y_t - \bar{y}_t) \end{aligned}$$

- **Instead**, central bank chooses and communicates a **policy-rate path**,

$$i^t \equiv \{i_{t+\tau,t}\}_{\tau=0}^{\infty(T)}$$

and forecasts of the target variables $Y^t \equiv \{Y_{t+\tau,t}\}_{\tau=0}^{\infty(T)}$

$$\min_{i^t, Y^t} \mathcal{L}(Y^t) \text{ subject to } (X^t, x^t, i^t, Y^t) \in \mathcal{T}(X_{t|t}, \dots)$$

- “Forecast targeting”: Choosing a policy-rate path so the forecast of the target variables “looks good” (best stabilizes inflation around target and resource utilization around normal)

3.9 Uncertainty

- Uncertainty about the state of the economy (additive uncertainty, certainty equivalence) (Svensson-Woodford 03)
- Uncertainty about the model/transmission mechanism (multiplicative uncertainty, not certainty equivalence) (Onatski-Williams 03, Svensson-Williams 07 MJLQ)
- Certainty equivalence practical compromise also under model/multiplicative uncertainty? (Sometimes more, sometimes less aggressive monetary policy than certainty equivalence, Söderström 02)

3.10 Judgment

- Time-varying add factors/deviations (Reifschneider-Stockton-Wilcox 97, Svensson 05)
- FOMC Bluebook 02: “Policymaker perfect-foresight projections”
Use judgment in Greenbook, optimal policy in FRB/US (Svensson-Tetlow 05)
- Application: Laséen-Svensson (2011), “Anticipated Alternative Instrument-Rate Paths in Policy Simulations”

4.2 Practice: Publishing an interest-rate path


- RBNZ (1997), Norges Bank (2005), Riksbank (2007), Czech National Bank (2008), Federal Reserve (2012)

4.1 Practice: The development of inflation targeting

- RBNZ: Towards more flexible inflation targeting
- Away from a fixed policy horizon
- More transparency about stabilizing resource utilization
- Fed, LS: Unemployment


4.3 Practice: The Riksbank

Policy options, July 2009




4.3 Practice: The Riksbank

Policy options, February 2010



4.4 Practice: Norges Bank

Policy options, March 2005



4.3 Practice: The Riksbank

Mean squared gaps: Simple theory

- Main scenario

$$(i^t, Y^t) \in \mathcal{T}(X_{t|t}, \dots)$$

- Loss for main scenario ($\delta = 1$)

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\mathcal{L}(Y^t)}{T+1} &\approx \frac{\sum_{\tau=0}^T (\pi_{t+\tau,t} - \pi^*)^2}{T+1} + \lambda \frac{\sum_{\tau=0}^T (y_{t+\tau,t} - \bar{y}_{t+\tau,t})^2}{(T+1)} \\ &= \text{MSG}(\pi^t) + \lambda \text{MSG}(y^t) \end{aligned}$$

- Alternative feasible interest-rate scenarios, deviations (di^t, dY^t), (Laséen-Svensson 11 anticipated, Leeper-Zha 03 unanticipated deviations, Svensson 10 Umeå)


$$(i^t + di^t, Y^t + dY^t) \in \mathcal{T}(X_{t|t}, \dots)$$

- If (i^t, Y^t) optimal (calculus of variation),

$$\mathcal{L}(Y^t) \leq \mathcal{L}(Y^t + dY^t)$$

4.3 Practice: The Riksbank

The application of judgment, February 2009



4.5 Preconditions for inflation targeting in emerging market economies

Important elements for success (Freedman and Ötker-Robe, 2009):

- 1 Price stability as the overriding monetary policy goal
- 2 Absence of fiscal dominance
- 3 Central bank instrument independence
- 4 Broad domestic consensus on the prominence of the inflation target
- 5 Some basic understanding of the transmission mechanism, and a reasonable capacity to affect short-term interest rates
- 6 Reasonably well-functioning financial system and markets

5 The future

- Price-level targeting
- Inflation targeting and financial stability: Lessons from the financial crisis