

Frank Smets and Rafael Wouters
 “Monetary Policy in an Estimated SDGE Model of the Euro Area”
 Discussion by Lars E.O. Svensson

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- Fine paper
- Eurosystem’s 1st pillar
- Indexation and the natural-rate hypothesis
- Reaction function and microfoundations
- Optimizing welfare vs. simple loss function
- Exploiting the powerful linear-quadratic framework
- Find optimal/simple targeting rule

- The Eurosystem’s 1st pillar (page 6)
 Additively separable utility

$$U_t^T = u(C_t^T - H_t) - v(l_t^T) + h\left(\frac{Q_t^T}{P_t}\right) \quad (2)$$

Demand for real balances

$$\frac{h'\left(\frac{Q_t^T}{P_t}\right)}{u'(C_t^T - H_t)} = \frac{i_t}{1 + i_t} \quad (8)$$

No role for money in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy/predicting inflation (Q reused for real value of capital)

Even without additive separability, insignificant effect (McCallum, Nelson, Woodford,...)

- Indexation and the natural-rate hypothesis
 Non-adjusted wages: Partial indexation to lagged inflation, γ^w

$$\hat{W}_t^T - \hat{W}_{t-1}^T = \gamma^w \hat{\pi}_{t-1} \quad (9)$$

Better: Partial indexation relative to deviation of lagged inflation from average inflation

$$\hat{W}_t^T - \hat{W}_{t-1}^T = \gamma^w (\hat{\pi}_{t-1} - E[\hat{\pi}_t])$$

Real-wage equation

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{w}_t = & \frac{\beta}{1 + \beta} \hat{w}_{t+1|t} + \frac{1}{1 + \beta} \hat{w}_{t-1} + \frac{\beta}{1 + \beta} (\hat{\pi}_{t+1|t} - E[\pi_t]) \\ & - \frac{1 + \beta\gamma_w}{1 + \beta} (\hat{\pi}_t - E[\pi_t]) + \frac{\gamma^w}{1 + \beta} (\hat{\pi}_{t-1} - E[\pi_t]) \\ & - \dots \end{aligned} \quad (36)$$

$E[\hat{w}_t]$ independent of $E[\pi_t]$

Non-adjusted prices: Partial indexation to lagged inflation, γ^p
 Better: Partial indexation to deviation of lagged inflation from average inflation

$$\hat{\pi}_t - E[\pi_t] = \frac{\beta}{1 + \beta\gamma^p}(\hat{\pi}_{t+1|t} - E[\pi_t]) + \frac{\gamma^p}{1 + \beta\gamma^p}(\hat{\pi}_{t-1} - E[\pi_t]) + \dots \quad (35)$$

Fulfill natural-rate hypothesis: $E[\hat{Y}_t]$ independent of $E[\pi_t]$
 Important for welfare

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• Reaction function and microfoundations ($\hat{R}_t = \ln(1 + i_t) \approx i_t$)

$$\hat{R}_t = \rho\hat{R}_{t-1} + (1 - \rho) \left[\bar{\pi}_t + r_\pi(\hat{\pi}_{t-1} - \bar{\pi}_t) + r_{\pi e}(\hat{\pi}_{t+1|t} - \hat{\pi}_t) + r_y(\hat{Y}_t - \hat{Y}_{t-1}) \right] + \varepsilon_t^R \quad (39)$$

- Mechanical, arbitrary, depend on other variables?
- Simultaneity, $\hat{\pi}_t$, $\hat{\pi}_{t+1|t}$, \hat{Y}_t jump variables, not operational
- Instrument depend on predetermined variables
- More realistic: $\hat{\pi}_t$, \hat{Y}_t predetermined
- Microfoundations!

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• Optimizing welfare not operational

– Simple loss function: For example, flexible inflation targeting

$$E_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \delta^{s-t} L_s$$

$$L_s = \frac{1}{2} [(\hat{\pi}_s - \bar{\pi}_s)^2 + \lambda x_s^2]$$

$x_t \equiv \hat{Y}_t - \hat{Y}_t^n$ output gap

- Compare with welfare
- Find optimal λ and definition of potential output, \hat{Y}_t^n

• Exploit linear-quadratic setup

- Equilibrium under discretion, commitment,
- Compare commitment, /discretion, welfare/simple loss function, welfare loss
- Optimal simple loss function under discretion and commitment (λ , \hat{Y}_t^n)

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• Derive optimal/simple Euler condition/FOC (MRS = MRT)

- Optimal/simple targeting rules
- Commitment to optimal/simple targeting rule rather than instrument rule
- Get close to optimal policy under commitment

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