Update, August 2017: “Cost-Benefit Analysis of Leaning Against the Wind,” published in Journal of Monetary Economics 90 (2017) 193-213.
The first version, under the title “Cost-Benefit Analysis of Leaning Against the Wind: Are Costs Larger Also with Less Effective Macroprudential Policy?”, was published as IMF Working Paper WP/16/3, January 2016.
Update, August 2017: “Cost-Benefit Analysis of Leaning Against the Wind,” published in Journal of Monetary Economics 90 (2017) 193-213.
The first version, under the title “Cost-Benefit Analysis of Leaning Against the Wind: Are Costs Larger Also with Less Effective Macroprudential Policy?”, was published as IMF Working Paper WP/16/3, January 2016.
“How Robust Is the Result That the Cost of ‘Leaning Against the Wind’ Exceeds the Benefit? Response to Adrian and Liang,” working paper, January 2017. CEPR Discussion Paper DP11744. ECB Working Paper No. 2031/February 2017.
Vox column
“Commentary on Monetary Policy and Financial Stability” (slides), presented at “Challenges to Financial Stability in a Low Interest Rate World,” Annual International Journal of Central Banking Research Conference, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, November 21-22, 2016.
Published as “Leaning Against the Wind: Costs and Benefits, Effects on Debt, Leaning in DSGE Models, and a Framework for Comparison of Results,” International Journal of Central Banking 13 (September 2017) 385-408.
Keynote presentation at the Norges Bank Conference “Rethinking Inflation Targeting,” Oslo, September 8-9, 2016. Slides. Paper.
“Amortization Requirements May Increase Household Debt : A Simple Example,” IMF Working Paper No. 16/83, April 2016.
The idea is very simple. If you like to have a mortgage of SEK 2 million the next 10 years, you would take out an interest-only mortgage of SEK 2 million now and keep it for 10 years. However, if you learn that new amortization requirements imply that you have to pay back 2 percent of the initial mortgage every year, you would prefer to borrow SEK 2.5 million now, put the extra SEK 0.5 million in a savings account, and then use withdrawals from the savings account to amortize 2 percent of SEK 2.5 million each year, that is, SEK 50,000 each year and SEK 500,000 in 10 years. Thus, if an LTV cap is not binding you would borrow SEK 2.5 million, or as much as the LTV cap allows you to borrow. Continue reading
“Cost-Benefit Analysis of Leaning Against the Wind,” Journal of Monetary Economics 90 (2017) 193-213. CEPR Discussion Paper DP11739, NBER Working Paper No. 21902. A previous version, with the longer title “Cost-Benefit Analysis of Leaning Against the Wind: Are Costs Larger Also with Less Effective Macroprudential Policy?”, was published as IMF Working Paper WP/16/3, January 2016.
Link to published version (Science Direct)
Abstract:
A simple and transparent framework for cost-benefit analysis of “leaning against the wind” (LAW), that is, tighter monetary policy for financial-stability purposes, is presented. LAW has an obvious cost in the form of a weaker economy if no crisis occurs and possible benefits in the form of a lower probability and smaller magnitude of (financial) crises. A second cost—less obvious, overlooked by previous literature, but higher—is a weaker economy if a crisis occurs. For representative empirical benchmark estimates and reasonable assumptions the result is that the costs of LAW exceed the benefits by a substantial margin. The result is robust to alternative assumptions and estimates. A higher probability, larger magnitude, or longer duration of crises—typical consequences of ineffective macroprudential policy—all increase the margin of costs over benefits. To overturn the result, policy-interest-rate effects on the probability and magnitude of crises need to be more than 5–40 standard errors larger than the benchmark estimates.
“Monetary policy and macroprudential policy: Different and separate?”, Canadian Journal of Economics, (2018) 51(3) 802-827. Paper. Published article.
The paper discusses how monetary and macroprudential policies can be distinguished, how appropriate goals for the two policies can be determined, whether the policies are best conducted separately or coordinately and by the same or different authorities and how they can be coordinated when desired. The institutional frameworks in Canada, Sweden and the UK are briefly compared. The Swedish example of monetary policy strongly “leaning against the wind” and the subsequent policy turnaround is summarized, as well as what estimates have been found of the costs and benefits of leaning against the wind. Continue reading
Monetary policy should stick to its core mandate of price stability, and should deviate from its traditional role only if the benefits to the economy outweigh the costs, according to a new study from the International Monetary Fund, “Monetary Policy and Financial Stability.”
The question is whether monetary policy should be altered to contain financial stability risks. Should it lend a hand by temporarily raising interest rates more than warranted by price and output stability objectives?
Based on our current knowledge, and in present circumstances, the answer is generally no.
“Forward guidance,” International Journal of Central Banking 11 (September 2015), Supplement 1, 19-64. New revision, now including the U.S. experience. Paper. Abstract.
Appendix: Slides for Sweden Feb 2007-Sep 2014, New Zealand Mar 2004-Mar 2014, U.S. Jan 2012-Mar 2017 (updated).
“Inflation targeting and leaning against the wind,” in South African Reserve Bank (2015), Fourteen Years of Inflation Targeting in South Africa and the Challenge of a Changing Mandate: South African Reserve Bank Conference Proceedings 2014. Pretoria: South African Reserve Bank, 19-36. Paper. Slides. Program. Continue reading
New publication: “The Possible Unemployment Cost of Average Inflation below a Credible Target,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 7(1) (2015) 258-296.
“Forward guidance,” International Journal of Central Banking 11 (September 2015), Supplement 1, 19-64. Paper.
Appendix: Slides for Sweden Feb 2007-Sep 2014, New Zealand Mar 2004-Mar 2014, U.S. Jan 2012-Mar 2017 (updated). Continue reading
Riksbankens mandat bör förtydligas, sysselsättningen ges större vikt, den demokratiska kontrollen av Riksbanken skärpas och koordineringen av penningpolitiken och makrotillsynen förbättras. Det skriver jag i den nya underlagsrapporten Penningpolitik och full sysselsättning för LOs projekt Full sysselsättning och solidarisk lönepolitik. Continue reading
Vox column: Why leaning against the wind is the wrong monetary policy for Sweden, referring to this new paper.